



And the lions were lying in the sidelines on the thresholds of the slopes and on the tops of the peaks, in their hands were a few weapons and a lot of determination and in their hearts deep faith in God and the homeland, and the .roar of lions exploded in the face of the black tide... God is the greatest





slopes, on the shoulders of hills, and above peaks, with little arms in their hands, but with great determination, and in their hearts deep faith in God and the homeland. The Lions, then, erupted in the face of the black tide, shouting: "Allahu akbar" (God is the Greatest).





مَلِكِ الْمَمْلُوكَاتِ وَالْمَمْلُوكِينَ

الْمَلِكِ الْمُؤْتَمِنِ مِنَ اللَّهِ التَّوْفِيقِ وَالْعَزِيزِ





مَلِكِ الْمَمْلُوكَاتِ وَالْمَمْلُوكِيَّةِ

الْمَلِكِيَّةِ مِنَ اللَّهِ التَّوْفِيقِ وَالْعَزِي





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
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"in the name of God, the Merciful,
the Compassionate"







The Battle of Karama March 21, 1968

The Battle of Karama, a record of glory and the Book of the Immortals, during which the brave soldiers of the (Jordanian) Arab army wrote their utmost glorious battles and victories over the untainted Jordan soil, where the souls of the martyrs hover over the spaces of Jordan, its plains, plateaus, valleys and mountains, and greet stationed comrades above its soil. The blossoming Jordan Valley flowers over their pure blood. The joy of victory and the ecstasy of pride in this Arab Hashemite army runs in the veins while hearts are reassured by the remembrance of God as they recite holy verses for the soul of the leader of the battle of Karama King Hussein, may his soul rest in peace, as well as the martyrs of Karama, Al-Latrun, Bab Al-Wad, Jerusalem and the Golan heights where the blood of the ancestors mingles with the blood of the predecessor in Yarmouk , Hattin, Muta, Fahl and Krama. Thus, the nation transcends the sanctity of its land, the freedom of its people, the dignity of its nation, and the authenticity of its message that the leaders of this country inherited from the Hashem family until the victory in Al-Karama resulted in building, generosity, cooperation and solidarity among the members of the same family, The town bore the name Al-Karama, although the area of the country does not exceed 2 km, but the area of the battlefield reaches 1,200 km, and the military operations were all in the town of Al-Karama.





A brief history of the town of Karama


Al-Karama, before 1948, was an agricultural area called the Abar area due to the many artesian wells in it, and it was called “Ghor Kabd” . when the Catastrophe occurred in 1948, The Palestine refugees moved to the eastern bank of Jordan river where a large number of them resided in this area, most of whom were farmers. His Majesty the late King Abdullah visited them, met with them, inspected their conditions, and with His Majesty generous grant, they were allowed to settle and build new homes in this area, and since then it was called the Karama (dignity), expressing late King Abdullah’s generosity, and they engraved a stone at the entrance to the town with the name Al-Karama written on it from the year 1949 A.D.

The town has developed and its population increased to reach (40) thousand people. Its agriculture flourished and it became a market for agricultural products while comprehensive services were also available. Health, education and etc. After the war in 1967, the population of the town increased as a result and the enemy



targeted it in its attacks. On March 21, 1968, the Battle of Karama took place. The enemy demolished most of the town's homes, schools and places of worshiping. The Jordanians, nevertheless, were superior to the treachery of the enemy, and the enemy withdrew, dragging the trails of shame and disgrace underneath the might and composure of our Arab army that wrote wonderful images of the heroism to immortalize the name of the town and the Karama battle in history.

The Jordanian people have become accustomed to many and continuous honors from the AL-Albeit (Hashemites A committee called the Committee for the Reconstruction of the Karama town was formed in 1972. It took over the establishment of a model town that replaced the old one which was destroyed by the Zionist enemy. Today, in its green landscape with its righteous children, the Karama town represents a wonderful model for development, modernization and a challenge to the enemy. Visitors can observe it as a monument to the martyrs of the battle of Karama in honor of the heroes of the generation of the Arab Army whose blood saturated the land of Karama in order to defend and protect their homeland.





The Enemy's goals from the aggression on March 21, 1968

The aggression on Jordanian lands post the 1967 war by the Israeli authorities intended to achieve the following objectives:

- A. Eliminating the power of the Jordanian Arab army before it was able to completely regain functionality, especially since the battle came nine months after the 1967 war.
- B. Destroying the morale of our armed forces first and the Jordanian people second.
- C. Destroying the economic life in the Jordan Valley, which is the main agricultural resource in the Kingdom.
- D. Occupying the eastern heights of the Jordan Valley in order to bargain over, impose a fait accompli and force the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to acquiesce in the imposition of the enemy's conditions and impose a peaceful settlement on it and add new problems and burdens.

To achieve its goals, the enemy chose the most sensitive areas along the Jordanian front

severity they face and whatever the cost was.

C. The units were prepped for an imminent battle was at their doorstep, and all necessary precautions and preparations had been taken to confront the expected attack.

General Situation Israeli forces.

A. The positioned Israeli forces on the western bank of the Jordan River since the June War of 1967 have occupied the defensive line along the Jordan River, following the principle of exposure defense to keep the initiative in hand.

B. Israel carried out exposure operations during that period leading up to March 1968 with the intention of stopping the activity of our patrols and to prove to the Arab world that it is capable of taking the battle to any place it wants within Arab lands.

C. During March 1968, the activity of our border patrols increased, and as a result, Israel threatened Jordan and decided to carry out a military operation to destroy the Jordanian forces stationed on the front line.

D. Israel waged a psychological war against the citizens of the West Bank during the period leading up to the battle, claiming that within a few days they would be castoff to Amman.

and aimed to reach the following:

- (1) Reaching the Egyptian Triangle by crossing the of Prince Muhammad (Damia) bridge.
- (2) Reaching the Southern Shuneh Triangle – Al–Salt by crossing the King Hussein Bridge (Jericho).
- (3) Reaching the Amman Triangle – Shuneh by crossing the Prince Abdullah Bridge (Naour)
- (4) The adversary aimed to reach these areas to control the cross road and cut off the transportation lines to the Jordanian forces front in preparation for any subsequent operations, developing its attack, and occupying the eastern hills.

Jordanian forces.

A. The Jordanian forces have been stationed on the eastern bank of the Jordan River since the 1967 war, and they have occupied a defensive line along the front facing the enemy forces.

B. The Jordanian forces were psychologically prepared and ready to face the hostile forces at any time and place. His Majesty the Supreme Commander (the late King Hussein) directions were that they must repel the enemy's attacks, no matter the violence and



The intelligence situation ahead of the battle

Military intelligence is a force that is used in all phases of wars and has an essential and distinctive role in the conflict with the Zionist enemy, especially in the battle of Karama. The enemy was unable to achieve the surprise at the tactical or strategic level as our forces were fully aware of what the enemy was planning.

The intelligence had been following the movements of the Zionist enemy since the beginning of its mobilization in the central Jordan Valley and in the Ghor Al-Safi area and was aware of the size of the mobilized forces since the beginning of their movement from their rear camps until they were integrated in frontline areas. Even when the enemy forces were fully formulated in the evening of March 20, the situation was determined. The size and intentions of the hostile forces were accurately determined and passed on to the armed forces in the frontlines.





Indicators of the Israeli aggression:

- A. The launching of media and propaganda war.
 - B. the Increasing activity of reconnaissance elements of the locations of our forces throughout the area of operations.
 - C. enemy planes infiltrated our airspace for the purpose of reconnaissance and photography of our sites.
 - D. Mobilization of armored forces, artillery, paratroopers, and helicopters in forward positions near the Jordan River and opposite Ghor al-Safi.
- The Jordanian military intelligence was able, by its own means, to determine the zero hour for the hostile attack as it was 0530 on March 21 1968.

National Forces.

The Jordanian Armed Forces (Arab Army) have been reorganized in the aftermath of the 1967 war. Our forces on the front line were as follows:

A. The 1st Infantry Division defends and supports the central and southern region, from the Zarqa River in the north to Aqaba in the south along with the 60th Armored Brigade in its support, it was organized as follows:

- (1) The Hittin Brigade occupies defensive positions near Naour.
- (2) Alia Brigade occupies defensive positions near Wadi Shu'eib.
- (3) Al-Qadisiyah Brigade occupies defensive positions near Al-Ardah.
- (4) In support of the 60th Armored Brigade (the Prince Hassan bin Talal Brigade), the 1st Infantry Division where one of his battalions was distributed.

The following forces were distributed on the battlefield:

- (A) A tank company occupies defensive positions near Prince Muhammad Bridge.
- (B) A tank company supporting and occupying defensive positions near Wadi Shu'eib.

The position of the two parties until the evening of March 20, 1968: Enemy Forces.

As a result of the information available from our intelligence sources, the enemy forces were estimated as follows:

- A. The 7th Armored Brigade (Regular Armored Brigade) is considered one of the oldest and most capable of the Israeli armor brigades. The armed forces repelled him and forced him to retreat after he suffered great losses.
- B. 60th Armor Brigade.
- C. 80th Infantry Brigade.
- D. 35 Paratroopers Brigade.
- E. Five field and heavy artillery battalions (105 Hauser, 155 mm).
- F. Four squadrons of Mirage and Mister fighter jets, and Helios, which can transport two battalions.



- (C) A tank company occupies defensive positions near Al-Ardah.
- (D) A tank battalion plays the role of reserve for the army in the Tabarbour area.
- (E) The division is supported by three heavy field artillery battalions.
- (F) The division is supported by a field engineering battalion.
- (G) An infantry division defends the northern region, from the Zarqa River in the south to the Yarmouk River in the north, supported by the Armored Brigade.

The two parties' plan

Enemy's plan:

- A. After the 1967 war, the enemy relied in distributing its forces along the front lines on the principle of occupying organized deep strong points with advanced observation points to pass information and inflict losses in any attack against its forces.
- B. The enemy's main forces occupy rear positions on the western heights of the Jordan River, available for intervention at the appropriate time and place.

Our Forces Defense Plan

A. The 1st Infantry Division defends the area of responsibility with three infantry brigades and a tank battalion. An infantry brigade defends the Sweimeh – Amman junction. An infantry brigade defends the junction of Wadi Shuaib – Salt, and an infantry brigade defends the junction of Damia–Al–Ardah–Salt beside the extraction of veils with the capacity of an infantry battalion and a tank company supported by the fire of three field artillery battalions to destroy and prevent the enemy forces from occupying the heights of Salt and the heights of Naour.

B. The distribution of forces was as follows:

(1) The veils are distributed as follows:

- (A) An infantry company and a tank platoon on the Prince Abdullah bridge.
- (B) An infantry company and a tank platoon on King Hussein Bridge.
- (C) An infantry company and a tank platoon on Damia Bridge.

C. The concept of enemy operations in carrying out the attacks against our forces was as follows:

- (1) The movement from the gathering area to the areas of Jericho and Al-Jiflik.
- (2) The movement to the front gathering areas west of the river and towards the river and towards the bridges.
- (3) The enemy has assigned its forces with an estimated armored division plus, at a rate of one combat group for each of the main junctions, keeping the rest of the forces as reserve in order to boost any achievements on any junctions.
- (4) The attack began at 0530 towards our forces in order to establish a foothold on the river and up to the Northern Shuna Road – the Dead Sea.
- (5) Develop its attack towards his potential targets to occupy the heights of Salt or the heights of Naour by taking advantage of the success on any of the approaches.
- (6) The enemy forces are supported by five artillery battalions and four squadrons of combat aircraft.



(2) The main defensive positions:

- (A) An infantry brigade defending the heights of Al-Kafrin.
- (B) An infantry brigade defending the heights controlling the Al-Ardah Triangle.
- (C) An infantry brigade defends the heights controlling the entrance to Shu'aib valley.



B. The approach of King Hussein Bridge (Jericho) – Al-Sunnah – Wadi Shu'ib – Eastern Highlands – Amman.

C. Sweimah approach via Prince Abdullah Bridge – Naour – Eastern Highlands – Amman.

D- The approach of Ghor Al Safi for diversion and possibly to reach Karak.

The fight is near the bridge of the Prince Abdullah Bridge (Sweimah) which is defended by the Hattin Brigade, as follows:

The enemy tried to build a bridge near Prince Abdullah bridge that was destroyed after the 1967 war. They were unable to do so as because of the heavy artillery shelling and the accurate bombardment of our armored forces that paralyzed their movement and silenced their fire after they tried twice to build that bridge. Moreover, our forces were able to silence all the enemy's weapons located near the Jewish palace and its artillery positions in Jowshen Alalmani.

Proceedings of the Battle

The enemy began to heat the front along its length from the northern region, from the front of the 2nd division to the front of the 1st division, the enemy focused its heavy bombardment on the front-line forces located at the Prince Muhammad bridge, King Hussein bridge and Swemah.

At 0500 on March 21, 1968, the enemy began its attack by storming the front posts, as our defensive battle began to develop using artillery and in-depth bombardment, as well as the weapons available with the front-line forces. Our artillery was able to prevent the enemy forces that tried to bridge at multiple sites on the Jordan River.

The situation became clearer and the enemy took the following approaches in their attack:

A. The approach of Prince Muhammad Bridge (Damia) – Egyptian Triangle – Ardah – Eastern Highlands – Amman.

(2) The proximity of enemy tanks to the positions of our artillery, especially the medium artillery, as the artillery became unable to support our forces and defend themselves in close combat.

(3) The disruption of wired and wireless communication with some of the front units chasing the enemy's remnants. Among them was the unit led by President Fadel Ali.

The fighting near the King Hussein Bridge – Al-Shunah – Wadi Shuaib, defended by Princess Alia brigade as follows:

The enemy began with heavy artillery bombardment on the veil forces and proceeded to towards Al-Shuna with two armored brigades, artillery and aviation. Before reaching the town of Al-Shunah, two forces separated from it, one of them heading south to Sweimah and Al-Karamah. The size of each of them is estimated of a mixed battalion of infantry and armored for the following reasons:

The main battle on this approach was on Al-Rama- Al-Shunah – Amman Junction, after the arrival of an enemy battalion group that separated from the main force heading to Wadi Shu'aib. Our forces held fast their grounds and confronted the attacking enemy forces, showering them with tanks shells and artillery fire. a testimony of the commander of this force, Lieutenant-Colonel Aharon Bild, illustrates the serious situation as he said: of the many bombing experiences that I witnessed, I never had such bombings. All my tanks were hit by artillery bombs except for two, and we remained under Jordanian shelling until one o'clock in the afternoon despite our presence Inside the tanks for protection, but the situation was grim.”

There are critical situations that our forces faced on this approach, as told by the commander of the brigade, Brigadier General (retired) Bahjat Al-Muhaisin in that period, and they are:

(1) inability to mobilizing our shields freely due to the complete air sovereignty of the enemy.

B. The enemy tried hard three times to enter the town of Al-Shouna but they failed, then another convoy advanced at 0710 and join the re organized force to the west of Al shunah as a reinforcement.

C. After fierce fighting, the enemy managed to take control of Al-Sunnah at 0945, and the battle continued on the outskirts of the town. A group of tanks from our forces tried to return the town and expel the enemy, but it was destroyed and all its soldiers were martyred.

D. There is no doubt that the fighting in this town was intense, and many individual heroism prevailed. The most prominent of which is that the Jordanian artillery rained down bombs on the enemy with high accuracy. The enemy figured out the source and tried to capture the observation post, but a message sent by the martyr hero, lieutenant Khader Shukri Yaqoub, who ordered his artillery post the following: “The enemy has encircled my position, immediately shower my position”. He and his group

1) The force headed for Sweimah intended to encircle the force of the veil located near Naour with aim to advance and occupy the eastern outskirts. After the enemy failed to cross this approach.

2) The force that headed towards Al-Karamah to maintain contact and rescue what is left of the paratroopers force present in Al-Karama as they faced difficulties. Our forces began an intense and focused artillery shelling, and dealt with the enemy with artillery, shields, and shields snipers the moment the enemy began its advance. It is essential to describe the fight in the town of Al-Shunah, especially that this fight had the main momentum of the battle, as follows:

A. The enemy was able to reach the outskirts of the southern parts of Al-Shunah at 0600, our troops destroyed the first eight of the enemy tanks which were forced to withdraw west of the Al-shuna for reorganization. The withdrawing force was estimated to be about a tank battalion.



achieved martyrdom for the sake of God.

The fight on the approach of the Prince Muhammad (Damia) bridge – the Egyptian Triangle – Al-Ardah – Al-Salt. This approach was defended by the Qadisiyah Brigade, **as follows:**

The enemy began with very heavy artillery fire on the veil positions with tanks fire and SS10 and SS11 missiles. their forces that were estimated by a tank battalion and Mechanized infantry battalion crossed the bridge and advanced towards the Egyptian triangle, bypassing our veil force. Artillery force that supported our forces on this approach launched heavy and intense fire towards the intrusive enemy forces. At 0645, the enemy began its approach to the Egyptian triangle with a vanguard estimated by fourteen tanks. On our side, a platoon of tanks (three tanks) stationed near the Egyptian triangle was able to stop the enemy's advance and forced it to



withdraw and gather in the killing area. Our cannons rained fire on their forces. The enemy tried unsuccessfully to build another movable bridge near the destroyed Damia Bridge to reinforce its forces east of the river between 0700 until 1000, but they suffered losses and failed to build the bridge. This was accompanied by another setback related to the inability to cross the Egyptian Triangle. Then the enemy floundered by trying another kind (psychological) attack to undermine the morale of the citizens by throwing flyers from planes.

The fight on this approach was mainly a fight of armor, artillery and aircraft. As huge numbers of shells used by the enemy in the units located on this approach, their ammunition began to dwindle and their supplies came with great difficulty.



The fighting near Ghor Al-Safi – Karak

The enemy on this approach, using score of tanks and motorized rifles to attack the Jordanian forces and installations to penetrate as far as possible and destroy, terrorizing the people as distraction to the efforts of the Jordanian General Command to concentrate on the main attack. the enemy paved the way for his attack by throwing flyers from the planes calling on the residents to surrender and raise white flags and not to resist. Then they started bombing every movement with his planes.

The enemy aircraft bombed the Al-dahhal police station (Ghor al-Safi) at 0745. an estimated force of 60 armored vehicles advanced towards the outpost and clashed with our forces in the area.

Under the pressure of the enemy's large number and equipment, it was able to approach the centers of our forces in the area. Consequently, our forces retreated from their positions to the Marsad outpost where they were able to stop the invading



force and destroy two tanks in the outpost area around 1400 after which the enemy began to withdraw. The General Command of the Jordanian Armed Forces/Arab Army ordered the commander of the reserve force to push forward the tanks to participate in the battle and expel the enemy forces.

The Fifth Tank Battalion was present in the Tabarbour area, and orders were given to it to move on tracks under the enemy's aerial bombardment from the beginning of its movement until its occupation of its assigned sites. The battalion was distributed as follows:

- a. Tank company to reinforce the Swemah approach.
- b. Tank company to reinforce the approach of Wadi Shuaib.
- c. Tank company to reinforce the approach of Damia.



The battalion was able to occupy the sites assigned to it and clashed with the enemy at 1130 with fierce fighting. Which, despite the advanced aerial and ground presence, resulted in the Israeli forces incurring great losses in vehicles and equipment and in many dead and injured troops. Many attempts were made by the enemy forces to evacuate their vehicles, dead and injured from the battlefield and withdraw from the battlefield. Not until 1830, the enemy was able to escape to the west, leaving some of its destroyed vehicles.





Battle results

The most prominent results of the Al karamah battle were the following:

- a. For the first time, at 1130, the enemy called for a cease–fire, but His Majesty the Supreme Commander issued his orders to continue the fight until the invading force is forced out to the west of the river.
- b. The enemy failed to achieve its mission in all the approaches, and began to withdraw after incurring heavy losses. they tried to withdraw vehicles and individuals under heavy Jordanian forces' fire at around 1200.
- c. The enemy was not able to support and evacuate its forces, the bodies of its fighters, and its damaged vehicles not until after 2100 at night, after a ceasefire as some of them remained on the battlefield.
- d. The Battle of Al–karamah was a turning point in the modern history of the Arab nation and in the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict, where the legend of (the indomitable army) asked for a ceasefire.



- e. The enemy refrained from engaging in any battle with the ground forces later on. Its battles were limited to aerial and artillery bombardment, landing of helicopters loaded with soldiers, and the destruction of some bridges. After the battle of Al-karamah, the enemy did not venture into a real confrontation with our forces.
- f. The Israeli enemy incurred heavy losses at the political level. Where it was once again branded as an act of aggression, and a large part of international opinion has shifted in our favor, especially after the major press conference held by His Majesty the late King Hussein which had a great impact on the international diplomatic and media forums.
- g. The enemy was struck by a local political shock and a wave of discontent appeared in its popular and official circles.
- h. The enemy incurred a huge economic loss estimated at millions, as it used weapons equivalent to a massive brigade and half of armors, infantry, and aerial force, all of

which went in vain and without achieving the goal.

i. The enemy wanted from the battle of Alkaramah to destroy the morale of our forces, but the victory raised morale in the military political and civil circles alike, and the proof of this is that the funerals our martyrs crowned our nation's pride, glory, honor and courage.

j. The enemy, in its psychological war and its poisonous rumors, almost succeeded to make our troops discrediting their equipment and weapon systems after the 1967 war. When the battle of Al karamah took place, the same weapons, arms with weapons and ammunition were used. Our forces were able to destroy the enemy and its vehicles, thus regaining confidence in these weapons.

K. Parties' losses

(1) Enemy losses: The enemy's incurred losses during the Battle of Karama are as follows:

(A) Individuals. (250) killed and (450) wounded.

(B) Equipment: Losses that remained on the battlefield:

(aa) (11) destroyed tanks.

(bb) (3) Troop carriers.

(cc) Two 3-ton cars.

(dd) (3) (cars).

(C) Losses that our forces witnessed, wounded and destroyed, which the enemy managed to withdraw:

(aa) (27) tanks of different types.

(bb) (18) troop carriers of different types.

(cc) 24 different Jeeps.

(dd) (19) (different vehicles (trucks, tractors, vehicles)).

(ee) Seven combat aircraft.

(2) Jordanian forces losses.

(A) personnel:

(aa) (86) martyrs, including (6) officers.

(bb) (108) wounded, including (12) officers.

(B) Equipment:

(aa) (13) destroyed tank.

(bb) (39) vehicles.

(cc) (20) damaged tanks



Lessons Learned

The battle of Al Karamah revealed a number of lessons. the most important of which are the following:

A. Belief in the goal: After the June 1967 war, the Israeli enemy tried to make the

Jordanian soldier's to question their leadership and authority and used various means to achieve this. The Jordanian soldier's belief in the goal of fighting for what is just, sacred. Hence they were able to shatter the legend of the invincible army.

b. **Morale:** In the battle of Al Karamah, the enemy aimed to destroy the morale of the Jordanian army and the people with psychological warfare before and through this war. The determination and fixed resolve of our Arab army to fight even with white knives proved the strong morale of our soldiers and the negative impact on the morale of enemy soldiers.

c. **Good management:** Despite the intensity of the enemy's flight and its attack on supply convoys, these convoys reached the sites at the right time which enabled our forces to withstand and defeat the aggression.

D. **Cooperation between different commands:** Cooperation, homogeneity, and prior coordination between all types of commands and services deprived the enemy of

achieving its goals.

E. The good battle preparation: the rapid and the advanced warning along with the mobilizing the forces in the right place and time deprived the enemy the surprise factor.

Sayings about the battle of Alkaramah

Many Israeli officials spoke about the Battle of Alkaramah, commenting on it and its results, as did many international newspapers and news agencies, including:

a. The Israeli Chief of Staff at the time (Haim Bar-Lev) said in an interview published by the Israeli newspaper Haaretz that “Al-Karama Operation is unique due to the high number of casualties in our forces and other incidents like the Jordanian forces seizing a number of our tanks and vehicles.”

b. A wave of denunciations in the Knesset occurred during government discussions about the Battle of Alkaramah. The Knesset member (Tawfik Tony) said: “The operation

proved once again that the Six–Day War did nothing and will not solve the Arab–Israeli conflict. M.P. Shamoel Tamri) said: “We demand the formation of a parliamentary committee to investigate the results of the campaign on Jordanian soil simply because the number of casualties in the Israeli forces is relatively greater,”. M.P. (Euri Avnery) said: “The military operation proved that we cannot achieve a military solution to the issue.” M.P. Shlomo Gersek also said, “We are skeptical about the number of casualties among our soldiers.»

C. One of the world’s military leaders said: “The steadfastness of the Jordanian army in the face of the Israeli attack constitutes a turning point for the Arab armies.” And that Israel lost in its attack mechanisms equivalent to three times What had been lost in the June war.

(1) (Arif Al-Shahwan, The Battle of Alkaramah, March 21, 1968, The Cultural Season Journal, Mutah University, 1985) Retired decorated brigadier general, His latest posts were (vice President of Mutah University for Military Affairs and then Commander of the Royal Armored Corps).


(1) Maan Abu Nowar, Battle of Alkaramah, Royal Geographical Center Press 2001, p. 193.













القوات المسلحة الأردنية - الجيش العربي
Jordan Armed Forces - Arab Army

